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Summary  findings
Inherent in  ptuirSulinlg  OpenneCSS  tO  international  capital  technology  and communications,  financial  risk
flows is an awareness  that  it brings  both  benefits  and  management  practice  has improved  significantly  in recent
risks.  Muchi of the currenit  debate  is about  how  best  to  years  through  the use of statistical  models,  such  as value
balancc  tlhem.  at  risk,  computer  simulation,  and  stress testing.
Major  beniefits for developinig  countries  include  access  At the  national  level, with  the worldwide  trend  toward
to a broader  mentI of investmiietnt  sources,  optionis,  and  democracy,  Dailami  argues  that  managing  the  risks of
instrumenits,  as well  as enhlaniced efficienicy of domestic  financial  openness  will require  developing  national
financial  institLitionis and  the discipline  of capital  markets  mechanisms  thirouglh whichi to provide  insurance  to
in conducting  domtestic macroeconomic  policy.  By easing  citizens  - through  the  mar-ketplace or  through
financing  constraints,  the  greater  availability  of  redistributive  policy  -and  thus  to avert  political
internationial  finanice canl extend  the period  for  pressure  for capital  controls.
implementing  needed  adjustments.  To succeed,  open  democratic  societies  have to balance
From  the perspective  of emerging  market  economies,  the  threat  of capital  exit,  made  easier by the opening  of
Dailami  highliglhts two  sources  of risk:  capital  markets,  with  the political  voice of citizens-
*  Thle host governments'  policy  of liberalizing  capital  demanding  protection  through  redistribution,  social
controls  before  having  established  the  macroeconomic,  safety  nets,  and  other  insurance-like  measures.  These
regulatory',  and instituttional  founldations  required  for  insurance  mechanisms  have been  critical  in easing the
capital  accounit openness.  tension  between  politics  and  financial  openness  in OECD
*  A shift in foreign  lenders'  and investors'  sentiments  countries.  Indeed,  cross-country  empirical  analysis
and  confidence,  not  necessarily  related  to a particular  confirms  that  countries  that  spend  a large share  of their
country  s long-ternm creditworthiness.  GDP on  social needs  (education,  health,  and  transfer
Risk maniagement  demands  judicious  strategies  for  payments)  are more  open  to free international  capital
botlh corporate  and  finanicial institutions  and  national  flows and  also score  high  on measures  of political  and
policy.  At tihe institutional  level,  with  the advances  in  civil liberty.
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"Times of trouble prompt us to recall the ideals by which we live."
- Michael J. Sandal, Democracy's Discontent
Abstract  Inherent in pursuing financial openness is the realization that there are
benefits and risks, and much current debate probes how best to balance them. Seen from
the perspective of emerging market economies, this paper highlights two sources of
financial risk: the policy of national host governments to liberalize their capital controls
without having achieved the macroeconomic,  regulatory, and institutional prerequisites
for capital account openness; and a shift in sentiment and confidence of foreign lenders
and investors not necessarily related to a particular country's long-term creditworthiness.
With the increasing trend towards democracy worldwide, the paper argues, managing
such risks will involve evolving mechanisms at the national level  through which
insurance is provided to citizens, either through the marketplace or redistributive policy
to avert political pressure for capital controls. Cross-country empirical analysis confirms
that countries that spend a high proportion of their GDP on social needs (education,
health and transfer payments) are open to free international capital flows, and also score
high on measures of political and civil liberty.
I. Introduction
International  financial  policy  is  currently  in  a  state  of  introspection  and
revisionism.  It is in search of a new paradigm to enlighten, explain, and draw lessons
from  the  novel  developments of  the  1990s: perforce,  the  globalization  of  finance,
increased volume and mobility of capital flows across national boundaries, financial
innovation and advances in information technology, and exposure to global financial risk.
Given  the  policy  consensus  and  conventional wisdom  of  the  1980s,  emphasizing
sequencing of  financial liberalization  and  macroeconomic stabilization, the financial
events of the 1990s came as a total surprise.
Many developing countries embraced globalization in the 1980s through trade in
goods  and  services and  began to  liberalize their  domestic  financial markets.  They
achieved considerable macroeconomic stabilization and enjoyed steady high economic
growth.  But they also became vulnerable in the 1990s to cycles of investor euphoria and
panic.  After a sharp increase in capital flows beginning in the early 1990s, a combination
of  tight  liquidity  in  international  capital  markets  along  with  austere  domestic
macroeconomic policy responses led to deep economic and financial crises.1
' The crises affecting emerging market economies in 1997-1998  were unprecedented in several important respects,
including the extent of initial depreciation of local currencies, the plunges in asset values on local equity and bond
markets, the severe financial distress in finance and industry, and the contraction of economic activity (see Table A5.5
in the Annex). Also, a large body of literature has developed over the past two years discussing the causes and
consequences of recent financial crises in emerging market economies. For a sample of such studies, see Sachs,
Tornell, and Velasco (1996), Calvo and Mendoza (1996), and IRadelet  and Sachs (1998).
2These crises have already imposed extremely high social and economic costs on
the  affected  countries.  Just  for  East  Asia,  the  loss in  aggregate domestic  output,
measured by deviation from historical trends, is estimated to be  $500 billion (in  1996
prices and  exchange rates) in  1997-1999.2  This is nearly  1.3 times those  countries'
external debt in 1996. With the memory of the debt crisis of the 1  980s and its prolonged
resolution  still  alive,  the  international  policy  response  was  prompt,  involving  the
extension of  large  stand-by and  direct  loans  in  order to  refinance maturing  foreign
exchange obligations and restore confidence.  The total volume of international financial
assistance  committed  from  August  1997  to  December  1998  to  Thailand,  Korea,
Indonesia, Russia, and Brazil amounted to  $190 billion-1.4  times the total  stock of
foreign exchange reserves for these countries--and 30 percent of the foreign exchange
reserves of all developing countries at the end of 1997.3
The crises have also catalyzed interest in the broader debate on the functioning,
architecture, and regulation of international financial markets.  Fifty-five years after the
post-war  institutional reconstruction that  launched the Bretton Woods  consensus, the
international community must  again  contemplate how to  design  a  new  international
financial architecture that would  promote financial stability and  long-term economic
growth.
The underlying conditions, trends, and forces at play have changed substantially
since 1944.  Global financial markets have grown significantly in the size, complexity,
and range of services and products that they offer.  Private capital has emerged as the
dominant source of development finance, surpassing official finance by a factor of 5 to 1
in recent years.  In addition, the Euro has been launched, which could potentially rival the
US dollar in both the international payment system and international finance.
Even more important, the spread of democracy and increased political and civil
liberty mean that for the first time in human history, electoral democracy is the world's
predominant form of government.  According to a recent survey by the Freedom House,
88 of the world's  191 countries (46 percent) - the largest number ever recorded - were
rated  as free, meaning that  "they  maintain a  high  degree  of political  and  economic
freedom and respect for civil liberties." 4
Inherent in pursuing financial openness is the realization that there are benefits and
risks, and much current debate probes  how best  to  balance them. 5 The benefits to
developing countries include access to a broader menu of investment sources, options,
and  instruments,  enhanced  efficiency  of  domestic  financial  institutions,  and  the
disciplinary impact of capital markets in conducting domestic macroeconomic policy.  At
2 See Note I in Annex for an explanation of the methodology used in this calculation.
3See  Dailami (1998) and Eichengreen (1999) for further elaboration.
4 A majority of the world's population is run by democratically elected governments - thus, today, 2.354 billion people
(40 percent of the world's population) now live in free societies, 1.57 billion (26.5 percent) live in countries that are
partially free and 1.984 billion (33.5 percent) live in non-free countries. See Karatnycky (1999).
In a survey paper, Williamson and Mahar (1998) reviewed empirical studies and experience of financial liberalization
and its linkage with financial crises. Their conclusion is that financial liberalization offers economic gains but it carries
many risks. In twenty-four countries that had experienced financial crises, thirteen of them had liberalized their capital
account within five years prior to crises.
3the same time, capital account openness, if not appropriately sequenced and grounded in
broader financial sector reform and institutional development, could expose the domestic
economy to  a  series  of  risks,  such as  reversals  in  capital  flows  and  illiquidity  in
international capital markets.
*  Identify the risks.  The main risks to financial stability in developing countries come
from two sources.  The first is in the policy of national host governments to liberalize
their  capital controls through  removal  or relaxation  of  exchange restrictions  and
barriers to capital transactions (both inward and outward) without having achieved
the macroeconomic, regulatory, and institutional (political) prerequisites for capital
account openness.  In regard to the supply of foreign capital to developing countries,
a  shift  in  sentiment  and  confidence  of  foreign  lenders  and  investors  (both
transnational and institutional) not necessarily related to a earticular country's  long-
term creditworthiness constitutes the second source of risk . This shift in investors'
sentiment has its most immediate and dramatic impact when the supply of capital
takes the forn  of short-term bank lending and portfolio investments in local stocks
and bonds.  So, this second type of risk has come to be associated with volatility in
short-term capital flows, as distinct from long-term direct investments in plant and
equipment.
- Elucidate strategic objectives.  Having identified these risks to developing countries'
integration into global financial markets, the second step in evolving an effective risk
management  strategy  is  to  elucidate the  overall  objectives  that  the  strategy  is
supposed to serve. These objectives can be defined broadly-openness to international
capital movements, democratic forms of  governance, and policy autonomy.  They
command a wide degree of respect among scholars and policymakers dealing with
international finance.  And their appearance at the center of the policy debate clearly
reflects  the  remarkable  success  in  the  global  advance  of  democracy,  political
freedom, and finance (international financial transactions now dwarf trade in goods
and services by more than 5 to 1 as a percentage of global GDP).
*  Develop mechanisms  to  mitigate  and  share  risks.  The  third  step  in  this  risk
management  strategy  involves  the  development  of  appropriate  institutional  and
regulatory frameworks to minimize the likelihood of future crises-and  mechanisms
to contain their associated socio-economic costs.  When domestic markets for risk-
sharing are absent or imperfect, redistributive policy can act as a partial substitute in
mitigating risks induced by volatility of capital flows.  The need for redistribution
arises because capital account liberalization is likely to increase economic insecurity
and inequality as the threat of exit of capital increases-and  with that the political
voice or demand for protection.
So, to avert the pressure for capital controls, there must be mechanisms through
which insurance is provided to citizens, either through marketplace or public provision, to
6 There are both quantity and price implications to a shift in foreign investors' sentiment that need to be taken into
account.  On the quantity side, a change in the creditors and investors' willingness to supply capital to a borrower can
take place, either through the refinancing of existing claims or through default and bankruptcy. The adjustment to
higher costs of capital would necessarily work through other channels, with important domestic implications in termns
of higher interest rates and slower investment and growth.
4protect them against the hazard of exposure to international financial volatility.  On the
international front, since capital account  liberalization implies welfare gains globally,
there exists a justification and rationale for international action-of  policy coordination,
prudential  financial  regulation  and  supervision,  and  lender-of-last-resort activity  to
provide liquidity and emergency financial assistance.
II.  Rapid Expansion in International Capital Markets
By any measure, the growth in  international financial markets in the  1990s has
been stupendous.  The volume of international lending in new medium- and long-term
bonds and bank loans reached an estimated value of $1.2 trillion in 1997, compared with
$0.5 trillion in  1988 (BIS, 1998).  World trade in goods and services, though having
grown significantly since the  early  1970s, is now dwarfed  by international financial
transactions, at more than five times the value of world trade (Figure 5.1).  Some other
statistics: Cross-border transactions in bonds and equities in OECD countries, less than
10 percent of GDP in 1980, reached more than 100 percent of GDP in  1995.  Average
daily turnover in foreign exchange markets reached $1.6 trillion (up from $0.20 trillion in
1986), compared to the $4.7 trillion a year in trade in goods and services.  The ratio of
total global market capitalization of stock markets relative to world GDP rose from 23:1
in 1986 to 68:1 in 1996, while derivative markets expanded from $7.9 trillion in 1991 to
$40.9 trillion in 1997 (Table 5.1).
Figure 5.1:
Financial markets take off: Global financial market size and world trade
Percent of world GDP
100
1  Finance
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Financial  markets  include stocks and international  bonds and loans outstanding
Trade  figures are averages  of imports and exports.
Sources:  IFC, BIS, and IMF.
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Developing countries were  not  forgotten.  The  net flow  of  foreign capital to
developing countries rose from $98 billion in 1990 to $335 billion in 1997, a major part
of it originating from foreign direct investment, portfolio investments in domestic stocks
and bonds, commercial bank lending, and the issues of equity and bonds in offshore
markets  (Table  5.2).  Flows  of  foreign  direct  investment  to  developing  countries
increased more than six times from 1990 to 1998, and their share of global FDI flows has
risen from 25 percent in  1991 to  an estimated 42 percent in  1998, compared with  18
percent in the mid-1980s (World Bank, GDF, 1998).
Table 5.2:
Net long-term resource flows to developing countries (US$ billion)
Type of flows:  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998a
Net long-term resource  100.8  123.1  152.3  220.2  223.6  254.9  308.1  338.1  275.0
flows
Official flows  56.9  62.6  54.0  53.3  45.5  53.4  32.2  39.1  47.9
Private flows  43.9  60.5  98.3  167.0  178.1  201.5  275.9  299.0  227.1
From international capital  19.4  26.2  52.2  100.0  89.6  96.1  149.5  135.5  72.1
Markets
Private debt flows  15.7  18.6  38.1  49.0  54.4  60.0  100.3  105.3  58.0
Commercial bank loans  3.2  4.8  16.3  3.3  13.9  32.4  43.7  60.1  25.1
Bonds  1.2  10.8  11.1  37.0  36.7  26.6  53.5  42.6  30.2
Others  11.4  3.0  10.7  8.6  3.7  1.0  3.0  2.6  2.7
Portfolio equity flows  3.7  7.6  14.1  51.0  35.2  36.1  49.2  30.2  14.1
Foreign direct investment  24.5  34.4  46.1  67.0  88.5  105.4  126.4  163.4  155.0
a. Preliminary
Source: World Bank, Debtor Reporting System
6Why the expansion?
The acceleration in the globalization of capital markets and the resulting increase in
the volume of cross-country capital flows and financial transactions in the  1990s have
profoundly altered the structure of international financial markets.  This globalization of
finance is partly the result of advances in communication and information technologies,
which reduced cross-border transaction costs and information asymmetry. 7 It has also
come  from  financial innovations.  The creation of the Euro-currency  money market
centers linking national money and capital markets of major industrial countries; the
spread of modern risk management techniques; and the rapid extension of hedge funds
have  facilitated cross-border capital  flows.  And the liberalization  of  insurance  and
pension sectors in developed countries increased liquidity and the supply of capital to
developing countries.  Domestic reforms in the developing world also contributed, with
the privatization of public enterprises, macroeconomic stabilization, and the relaxation of
barriers to  cross-border trade in  financial instruments for both  sovereign and private
entities.  All this in turn improved country creditworthiness and expanded investment
opportunities.
Barriers to  the free flow of  capital across national boundaries, such as  capital
controls and foreign exchange restrictions have also been significantly dismantled.  In
the  OECD countries  progress towards  liberalization of  capital  controls  accelerated,
particularly  in  the  1980s, as  members'  liberalization obligation under  The  Code  of
Liberalization of  Capital Movements, were  broadened to  include virtually all capital
movements including short-tern  transactions by enterprises and individuals. 9 Thus, the
U.K. abolished all exchange controls and achieved capital account convertibility in 1979,
Japan in 1980, while the timeline for the rest of the OECD stretched until 1992, when the
last group-comprising Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain-completed the abolition of
their capital controls.  Thus, by the early 1990s, the capital accounts of OECD countries
were open to a wide range of cross-border financial transactions including capital market
securities, money market operations, forward operations, swaps, and other derivatives.
This  process  of  liberalization coupled with  internationalization of  financial  markets
means that today in  OECD countries borrowers can raise financing  in their  desired
currency at competitive tenns, and investors have the opportunity to achieve their desired
degree of portfolio diversification in terms of currencies, maturities and risk profile.
Regarding emrierging  market economies, the overall trends have also been towards
reform of local financial markets and liberalization of cross-border capital movements,
but the progress, the pace, and the scale of liberation measures have not been even.
The underlying liberalization trends have been most clear with regard to the rapid
increase in  the number of countries that have assumed the IMF Article VIII, thereby
declaring their currencies convertible on current accounts, which often precedes capital
account convertibility. In 1970 only 34 countries, or 30 percent of the IMF membership,
had declared their currency convertible on current account transactions.  By 1997, 143
From an historical perspective, the globalization of finance in the 1990s is equivalent to the level reached during the
gold standard period from 1870-1914. However, this applied only to a few industrial countries. See Verdier (1998).
8 The U.S. removed in 1974 the temporary capital restrictions that were imposed in the mid 1960s (see Helleiner,
1994).
9 See OECD (1990)
7countries had done so (see Figure 5.2). In the I1990s  alone, 38 countries, including India,
Russia, Turkey, Israel, Greece, and the Philippines assumed IMF Article VIII (see Table
A5.6 in Annex).  With regard to liberalization of capital controls in emerging market
economy, two sets of indicators are of interest: First,  actual flows of  capital that, as
shown above, have witnessed a significant expansion in the 1990s, with sharp drops in
1997,  1998,  and  recovering  once  again  in  1999.  Second,  national  governments'
deliberate policies in the  1990s, clearly reflect a considerable degree of opening up,
relaxing, and easing of exchange restrictions, controls, and barriers to the entry of foreign
financial players to engage in commercial banking, securities, asset management, and
other financial services.
More countries open their current account
Figure 5.2:
IMF member  countries with convertible currencies  on current  accounts
Countries  Assuming  IMF Article  Vill
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III.  How  Open  Are  Emerging  Market  Economies  To  International  Capital
Movements?
Evidence about emerging market  economies'  degree or  level  of  openness--or
closeness--to cross-border capital flows is scanty and fragmented.  Informational and
methodological problems have hindered the proper development of quantitative measures
of degree of financial openness. Most prior studies have relied on measures of incidence
of capital controls, i.e., whether a particular transaction is subject to restrictions or not,
8rather  than the  degrees of  intensity  of  such restrictions  and  controls.'0 In  practice
controls can take a variety of forms ranging from direct quantitative limitation on certain
transactions or associated transfers, to indirect measures - such as, withholding taxes or
reserves on  external assets/liabilities, intended to  influence the economic incentive to
engage in  certain transactions.  And such  controls  could apply  to  transfer  of  funds
associated with financial transactions or the underlying transactions themselves. There
exists of course no single measure of a country's level of openness, but a viable measure
of  a  country's  level  of  financial  openness to  international capital markets  needs  to
incorporate, at least, the distinction between the severity of controls and the different
types  of  transactions  contributing to  capital  flows.  Table  5.3 provides  preliminary
information on such a measure for a sample of 96 countries in 1997.
This  measure  referred  to  as  Financial  Openness Index  is  constructed  using
disaggregated measures of capital controls based on the classification and information
contained  in  the  IMF  Annual  Report  on  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange
Restrictions (AEAER), and drawing on the coding methodology developed by Quinn and
Toyoda (1997).  The measure is a composite index of our coding of rules, regulations,
and administrative procedures affecting capital flows (both inflows and outflows) for a
total of 27 individual transactions in the current and capital accounts of the balance of
payments (see Box 5.1) for each country in the sample.  Thus out of 96 countries in the
sample, it is interesting to note that 46 can be classified, as of 1997, as open and 10 as
semi-open, with both these categories including emerging market economies mostly in
the Latin America region and Eastern Europe.
10  See, for instance,  Razin and Rose (1994), Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994).
9Box 5.1:
Financial Openness Index
This index is based on information contained in the IMF Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (1998), and distinguishes between 27
individual transactions, classified into five groups, as shown below.
I.  Imports  and  Import  Payment
Foreign  exchange  budget
Financing  requirements  for imports
Documentation  requirements  for release  of foreign  exchange  for imports
Import  licenses  and other  non-tariff  measures
Import  taxes  and/or  tariffs
State  import  monopoly






III.  Payments  for Invisible  Transactions  and Current  Transfers
Controls  on these  payments
IV.  Proceeds  from Invisible  Transactions  and Current  Transfers
Repatriation  requirements
Restrictions  on use of funds
V.  Capital  Account Transactions
Capital  market  securities
Money  market instruments
Collective  investment  securities
Derivatives  and other instruments
Commercial  credits
Financial  credits
Guarantees,  sureties,  and financial  backup  facilities
Direct investment
Liquidation  of direct  investment
Real estate  transactions
Personal  capital  movements
Commercial  banks  and other  credit institutions
Institutional  investors
10Table 5.3:
Financial Openness Index*: selected developed and developing countries, 1997
Open**  Largely  Open**  Partially  Closed**  Largely  Closed**
Argentina  1.78  Croatia  1.54  Bahamas, The  1.36  Bangladesh  1.21
Australia  1.77  Ecuador  1.54  Belize  1.44  Barbados  1.28
Austria  1.92  Honduras  1.56  Benin  1.48  Bhutan  1.19
Bahrain  1.73  Israel  1.59  Botswana  1.48  Brazil  1.19
Belgium  1.88  Mongolia  1.56  Bulgaria  1.46  Ethiopia  1.12
Bolivia  1.79  Philippines  1.59  Burkina Faso  1.49  India  1.20
Canada  1.92  Poland  1.54  Burundi  1.39  Malawi  1.26
Denmark  1.92  Slovak Republic  1.58  Cameroon  1.41  Malaysia  1.34
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1.81  Slovenia  1.50  Cape Verde  1.39  Morocco  1.27
El Salvador  1.91  Turkey  1.52  Chile  1.43  Pakistan  1.31
Estonia  1.88  China  1.37  Syrian Arab Rep.  1.20
Finland  1.83  Colombia  1.38
France  1.73  Congo, Dem. Rep.  1.42
Germany  1.84  Costa Rica  1.48
Greece  1.91  Czech Republic  1.48
Guatemala  1.73  Dominican Republic  1.49
Guyana  1.72  Ghana  1.43
Iceland  1.74  Hungary  1.49
Ireland  1.93  Indonesia  1.46
Italy  1.84  Korea, Rep.  1.42
Jarnaica  1.76  Lesotho  1.41
Japan  1.73  Mali  1.49
Kuwait  1.77  Malta  1.40
Latvia  1.88  Moldova  1.46
Lithuania  1.85  Mozamnbique  1.41
Luxembourg  1.93  Namibia  1.33
Mauritius  1.82  Papua New Guinea  1.36
Mexico  1.69  Romania  1.48
Netherlands  1.87  Russian Federation  1.43
New Zealand  1.90  South Africa  1.44
Nicaragua  1.82  Sri Lanka  1.43
Norway  1.83  Thailand  1.46
Panama  1.90  Tunisia  1.39







Trinidad and Tobago  1.67
United Kingdom  1.86




(*)  Financial Openness Index: the scoring draws on the methodology originally developed by Dennis Quinn and
Carla  Inclan,  The  Origins  of Financial  Openness:  A Study of Current  and  Capital  Account  Liberalization,  1997,
and  is  based  on  information  contained  in  International  Monetary  Fund,  Annual  Report  on fxchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1998. For a full explanation of the scoring, see Appendix.
(*  * )  Open: Little or no regulation for outward/inward  transactions with a generally nondiscriminatory environment.
Largely  Open:  Some  regulations  are  exercised  on  outward  and  inward  transactions  with  the  need  of
documentary support but without the need of governmental approval.
Patially  Closed: Regulation and governmental approval is required for outward and inward transactions and it
is usually granted.
Largely Closed: Substantial restrictions and governmental approval is required and seldom granted for outward
and inward transactions.
11Characteristics of International Finance in the 1990s
Particularly striking in the 1990s are the numerous liquidity and currency crises,
such as those experienced by the European Monetary System in  1992-93, Mexico in
1994-95, East Asia (Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines) in 1997,
and Russia and Brazil in 1998.  All these emerging markets first had a surge in capital
flows (from the early-to-mid 1990s) and then fell victim to sudden reversals-on the order
of 10 percent of the GDP in East Asia.  The episodes in 1997-98 offer examples of how
one  of  the  largest  markets in  the  world-for  capital-could  fail,  at  several  levels.
Borrowing countries were not properly monitoring the high exposure of their domestic
banks and corporations to  foreign currency risk.  Major international players, such as
credit  rating  agencies,  failed  to  properly  assess  the  country risk  in  the  globalizing
financial environment of the 1990s.  Regulators failed because of the weakness of their
regulatory and supervisory frameworks.
Four salient features of international finance in this decade have helped to shape its
character as well as lead to crisis:
- First, high risks of contagion across countries exist in international capital and loan
markets.  During the Asian crisis, the world witnessed financial meltdowns spreading
from one country to another.
*  Second, these crises  and their corresponding shocks were largely unforeseen and
unexpected by market participants.  Credit spreads on emerging market debt declined,
and international bank lending continued to expand until just before the beginning of
the Asian  crisis.  This  dramatic change in  attitudes on  the part  of  international
investors and financiers has led some researchers to ascribe the cause of the Mexican
and  East  Asian  crises  to  self-fulfilling  investor  panics  and  speculative  attacks
(Radelet and Sachs 1998).
*  Third, capital flows into many developing countries were channeled through short-
term banking instruments, as  banks were  perceived to  have implicit government
guarantees.  As a result, credit standards and prudent project appraisals were often
compromised,  leading  to  over-investmernt in  sectors  with  surplus  capacity  or
declining demand.  Indeed, it appears that many market participants, if  not most,
succumbed to the inherent "moral hazard" in these perceived government guarantees.
This accounts for the simultaneous incidence of foreign exchange liquidity crises in
countries with fixed exchange rates and collapses of their domestic banking systems.
*  Fourth, the primary sources of instability originated in the capital account, unlike the
history of current account problems that Bretton Woods institutions were designed to
prevent.  This recognition has implications for the design of policy responses-and
for  the  traditional  approach to  country  risk  assessment.  In  today's  globalized
financial environment, a better measure of a country's external payments position is
12the  condition  of  its  total  balance  sheet-that  is,  its  assets  and  liabilities,  with
liabilities including both debt and equity.
Many developing countries moved in the 1  990s to liberalize financial markets and
relax restrictions on capital transactions, without putting into place adequate institutional
frameworks  on  money,  foreign  exchange  markets,  and  capital  markets.  As  they
liberalized, access to  a  broader menu of foreign financing  was opened to  banks and
corporate  borrowers,  with  strong  incentives  for  recourse  to  foreign  finance.  The
desirability of longer-maturity foreign capital for funding infrastructure projects provided
a strong competitive advantage to foreign capital, particularly in countries with a pegged
exchange rate regime to the U.S. dollar.  As the private sector became the main recipient
of foreign capital, the vulnerability to financial crisis has increased.  But, neither the
maturity nor the foreign exchange risk associated with foreign capital was taken into
account or properly priced.
Fairly  stable  macroeconomic environments  in  both  developed  and  developing
countries, subdued international interest rates, low commodity prices, and the optimism
of the post-Cold War era-viewed  against this backdrop, recent financial events in East
Asia, Latin America, and Russia underline the new nature and new sources of financial
risks in the 1990s. They also show why a broader risk management framework is critical
to meeting the challenges of globalization and thus to aiding development."  X Such efforts
have highlighted the role of four sets of factors-institutional and structural imperfections
in  international  capital  markets,  weakness  in  domestic  banking  systems,  unsound
corporate  governance  structures,  and  failure  to  manage  financial  risk  - as  key
determinants of  a  country's  vulnerability to  external financial shocks.  These newly
identified determinants provide the intellectual underpinnings for proposals to strengthen
the international monetary and financial system.
IV.  Managing Risks
Fundamental Objectives and Tradeoffs
Among scholars and policymakers concerned with international finance, openness
to international capital movements, democratic forms of governance, and national policy
autonomy  command  respect.  How  attainable  are  these  goals?  And  under  what
conditions?  These two questions been much debated in the literature on international
economics and politics.  That these goals occupy such official and scholarly attention
clearly reflects the remarkable global success in the advance of democracy, political and
civil liberty, and financial integration.
Indeed  a  closer  look  at  cross-sectional  evidence  uncovers  a  robust,  positive
association between indicators of financial openness and political and civil liberty across
"  These recent events in have required the development and elaboration of new analytical models (that are distinct
from the traditional Krugman model) to explain why some countries suffered from the financial shocks of the 1990s,
while others emerged relatively unscathed.
13a large sample of countries as shown by Figure 5.3. Political and civil liberty indices are
from the Comparative Survey of Freedom that Freedom House has provided on an annual
basis since  1973.12  The Survey rates each  country on a  seven-point scale for both
political rights and civil liberties (1 representing the most free and 7 the least free). So, it
can be argued that countries more open to international capital flows are also open in
offering a high degree of political and civil liberty to their citizens. Much current debate
probes how  best  to  achieve this  "triangle,"  and balance the  benefits  with  the risks
inherent in its pursuit.
Figure 5.3:
Correlations of capital openness with political rights and civil liberties






Note: The estimated  correlation  coefficients  are statistically  significant  (based on the z-test),  and
are robust  to alternative  quantitative  measures  of capital  account  openness.
Despite some risks, the benefits of open capital accounts outweigh their costs, for
both individual countries and the global economy as a whole.  That is generally agreed.
Major benefits for developing countries include access to a broader menu of investment
sources, options, and instruments.  They also include enhanced efficiency of domestic
financial  institutions,  and  the  discipline  of  capital  markets  in  conducting  domestic
macroeconomic policy.  And by easing financing constraints, the greater availability of
12 The Survey assesses a country's freedom by examining its record in these two areas: A country grants its citizens
political rights when it permits them to form political parties that represent a significant range of voter choice and
whose leaders can openly compete for and be elected to positions of power in government. A country upholds its
citizens' civil liberties when it respects and protects their religious, ethnic, economic, linguistic, and other rights,
including gender and family rights, personal freedoms, and freedoms of the press, belief, and association. The Survey
divides the world into three broad categories: "Free" (countries whose ratings average 1-3); "Partly Free" (countries
whose ratings average 3-5.5); and "Not Free" (countries whose ratings average 5.5-7). For more detail see Karatnycky,
Adrian. (1999).
14international  finance  can  extend  the  period  for  countries  to  implement  needed
adjustments." 3
For the global economy, open capital accounts support the multilateral trading
system, expanding the opportunities for portfolio diversification and efficient allocation
of  global savings and investment. 14 There is  also an important property rights issue
related to the free movement of capital across national boundaries.  As Richard Cooper
states, "individuals should be free to dispose of their income and wealth as they see fit,
provided their doing so does not harm others." 15 This view, embodying the thinking
behind a liberal order, constitutes the "ideal" for the reconstruction of the international
financial system to aspire toward.1 6
Another perspective questions whether the benefits of closer financial integration
outweigh its  socio-economic costs.  Volatility in  capital flows creates uncertainty in
economic growth.  And this  perception of vulnerability to  the internationalization of
capital flows sees developing countries on the periphery.  In the design and functioning
of  the  post-World War  II  international monetary  and  financial  system,  developing
countries exerted little influence.  The supply of foreign capital to  them was mostly
official aid,  grants,  and  loans  intended  for  governments or  public  entities through
multilateral or bilateral agencies.  Private capital was marginal, and it surged only in the
1970s with an expansion of commercial bank lending that ended with the debt crisis in
the 1980s. That was followed by a resumption of capital flows to emerging markets that
culminated in a currency crisis in Mexico in the winter of 1994-95 and a deeper financial
crisis in East Asia.
Mechanisms and Arrangements
Global financial risk and the strategies for managing it have changed substantially
over the past  fifty years.  Three distinct periods, each unique in the way the global
financial system changed, and the way in which countries dealt with the changes, can be
recognized.  The first  period, from  1945-1973, entailed the post-World War II  era,
Bretton  Woods  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates.  The  second  period,  which  lasted
throughout the 1970s and well into the 1980s, consisted of high, volatile inflation along
with macroeconomic instability.  The third distinct period is the post cold war of the
1990s.
13 Markets will be willing to provide this leeway, however, only if they perceive that countries are truly undertaking
adjustments that fundamentally address existing and prospective imbalances.  Otherwise, markets will eventually exert
their own discipline, in such a way that the time period for adjustment may be brutally shortened (see Dailami and
Haque 1998).
14 Fischer 1998
15  Cooper, p. 12 (1998)
16  Lawrence Summers, U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, has emphasized the importance of a liberal paradigm in
building a new international financial architecture, as well, stating "We should all be able to agree on the danger of ...
denying a country's own citizens the capacity to convert their own currency and invest abroad.  Such measures
represent substantial intrusions on freedom." (speech delivered October 22, 1998, Washington, D.C., Cato Institute's
16 eh Annual Monetary Conference)
15The Bretton Woods period combined fixed exchange rates with capital controls on
the extemal side and Keynesian macroeconomics with the welfare state on the domestic
side. 17 The solution devised at Bretton Woods gave priority to fixed exchange rates and
national policy autonomy.  As put forth by  several scholars, capital controls were an
accepted norm of the international monetary system in the 1  950s and 1  960s, as the
Bretton Woods Agreement did not grant the IMF jurisdiction over capital movements. 18
It was not until September 1997 that the Interim Committee of the IMF "agreed that the
Fund's  Articles (of Agreement) should be amended to make the promotion of capital
account liberalization a specific purpose of the Fund and to give the Fund appropriate
jurisdiction over capital movements." 19 Thus the relative closure of national economies
to the free flow of capital in that era-with  a few exceptions-afforded governments the
scope for deploying the instruments of fiscal and monetary policy, including progressive
taxation and public expenditures, in pursuit of national objectives of full employment and
social equity, without fear of the exit of capital.  The relatively high degree of policy
autonomy served well the cause of democracy, particularly in Western Europe, where it
advanced  to  a  high  degree of  maturity.  It  was not  until  the  1970s, after  Western
European countries had  achieved currency convertibility on their current accounts of
balance of payments, that free movement of capital across national boundaries emerged
as an important policy priority.
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, floating exchange rates, rising
oil  prices,  chronic  inflation,  and  slumping  global  economic  conditions  intensified
currency and interest rate risks in global financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s.  The
responses were principally "market solution" types of action, exemplified by the drive
towards international diversification of capital and the impressive expansion of derivative
markets (interest and currency forwards, options, and swaps).  Such steps occurred along
with  an  important  shift  in  the  direction  of  macroeconomic policy  away  from  its
traditional focus on full employment and toward price stability.
The success of these actions has been considerable on  both fronts.  Derivative
markets today provide a broad range of hedging instruments for managing currency and
interest rate risks in major currencies.  On the macroeconomic front, industrial countries
and many developing countries have had considerable success in attaining stability, with
smaller fiscal  deficits  and  lower  inflation  and  interest  rates.  Indeed, cross-country
empirical research shows that volatility  in main macroeconomic variables-economic
growth, export growth, and inflation-was  in the 1990s down more than 60 percent from
the 1980s (Table A5.7 in the annex).
17 This policy mix was referred to by John Ruggie (1983) as "a compromise of embedded liberalism" It connotes a
commitment to a liberal order different from both the economic nationalism of the 1930s and the liberalism of the gold
standard.  For further elaboration,  see G. Garrett (1998). R. Sally (1998) also referred to embedded liberalism as
"mixed system thinking."  Also see Dailami (1999).
Is Reflecting the understanding of the time, Keynes expressed the issue succinctly in his often quoted 1944 speech to
Parliament, stating that, "Not merely as a feature of the transition, but as a permanent arrangement, the plan accords to
every member govemment the explicit right to control all capital movements. What used to be heresy is now endorsed
as orthodox....  It follows that our right to control the domestic capital market is secured on firmer foundations than
ever before, and is formally accepted as a part of agreed international agreements" (Gold 1977, p.11).
'9 See Polak (1998), p. 47.
16In the  1990s, risk  management demands more judicious  strategies, both  at the
institutional level (i.e., corporate and financial institutions) and the national policy level.
The  global  financial  landscape  has  witnessed  significant  changes:  The
internationalization of the banking business; the breakdown of traditional  boundaries
between different sectors, such as banking, insurance, and underwriting; the emergence
of emerging markets as important investment opportunities; and the broader investor base
in emerging market economies which includes the commercial banks, pension funds,
hedge funds, and mutual and insurance industries. All pose new challenges and require a
more effective risk management approach.
At  the  same  time,  with  innovation  and  the  advances  in  technology  and
communications, financial risk management practice has improved significantly in recent
years.  20 The evolution of Value at Risk (VAR) in the mid-1990s has led to a significant
improvement in financial institutions' ability to measure market-related risk under normal
volatility conditions, in a systematic manner.  It has also stimulated a wealth of literature
and computer-based modeling with applications particularly in the banking sector, for
regulatory  capital  calculation  (allowed  under  the  recent  amendment  to  the  Basle
Committee on Bank Supervision, BIS, January  1996); and as a benchmark for market
risk. 21  Also, with the corporate focus on shareholder value increasing and the number
and  complexity of financial instruments expanding, the emerging perspective on risk
management at a corporate level is shifting towards a company-wide integrated approach,
encompassing credit, market, and operational risks in a holistic manner, integrating more
closely market risk, credit risk and measurement processes. The rapid expansion in credit
derivations  market  is  changing  fundamentally  the  banking  business  by  providing
opportunities to trade credit risk.
From the national perspective, a dilemma facing democratic societies is how to
manage the tension between financial market integration and national policy autonomy,
to pursue democratically defined economic and social goals. This tension between capital
market  integration  and  national  policy  autonomy  can  best  be  seen  analytically  in
Hirschman's terminology of exit and voice. 22 In a world with high mobility of capital
across national borders, the question facing open democratic societies is how to balance
the threat of exit of capital, made more credible by  opening capital markets, with the
political  demands  for  voice,  and  increased  political  incentives  for  government
intervention in cushioning market dislocation. The potential exit of capital heightens the
sense of economic insecurity and risk among a broader section of society.  Since the
benefits  are  disproportionately  shared,  at  least  initially,  and  the  costs  are  also
disproportionately borne by less-mobile factors of production - i.e. labor, agriculture -
the political dimension is important.
20 Recent  advances  in  risk  management  techniques  addressing  sovereign,  credit,  and  operational  risks  will
be explained  in the  forthcoming  conference  "Emerging  Markets  in the  New  Financial  System:  Managing
Financial  and  Corporate  Distress,"  organized  jointly  by  the World  Bank,  IMF,  and  the  Brookings
Institution.  For  details,  contact  the  author.
21 VAR summarizes  the worst  expected  loss  over  a specific  time  horizon,  within  a pre-defined  confidence  level,  such as
99% or 95%. The  literature  on VAR  is vast,  see  Jorion  (1996);  recent  application  of VAR  has also  raised  important
questions. For  example,  how can  extreme  market  situations,  --i.e., low probabilities,  and high  loss  events  that  occur
beyond  the 99%  or 95%  confidence  level-that might  affect  portfolio  value,  be incorporated  in the modeling  process
through  stress  testing,  EVT,  scenario  testing? How  might  a widespread  use of VAR  affect  contagion?
22 See  Hirschman  (1970).
17Financial market integration increases the exit potential of capital as investors dissatisfied
with the host countries' policies or prevailing investment climate would find it easier to
shift their financial resources to other countries and regions. The threat of exit of capital,
in this sense, refers not only to investors' decisions regarding existing foreign assets that
can be liquidated or unwind, but also to the domestic liquid assets, such as money, and
other liquid assets that can be converted and transferred.  The exercise of exit of capital
can be seen as a function of the degree of the "liquidity" of the underlying assets; the
more liquid the assets, the less transaction cost involved but also the degree of financial
openness of the country.  For fixed assets, investments in plant and equipment with high
sunk-in cost, the transaction cost in liquidating an investment is much higher.  Figure 5.4
provides an illustration of this dynarnic.
Figure 5.4:
Exit of capital as a function of the degree of the "liquidity"  of the assets
The more open the economy and the more liquid an
asset, the higher threat of exit of capital
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The Role of Redistribution in Mitigating Risk
The counterbalance to the threat of exit of capital is the political voice by citizens,
demanding  protection  against  external risk  through  redistribution,  social  safety net
programs, and other insurance-like measures. 23 Indeed critical in  easing the tension
between politics and financial openness in OECD countries, has been the role of their
23 Thus in this interpretation voice belongs to the political slphere,  the form that it takes, and how it is exercised is a
function of the underlying political institution and particularly the degree of political and civil liberty.
18redistributive policies  in  mitigating  and  redistributing risk,  through  massive  transfer
payments and other insurance-like government involvement.  Govemment expenditures
on health, education, social security, and welfare have averaged, in high income OECD
countries in recent years (1991-1997) about 25 percent of their GDP, with smaller open
European countries such as, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, spending as much as 30%
of their GDP. 24 Taking a large sample of countries, one can see strong cross-sectional
evidence of a positive association between redistribution, financial openness, and civil
and political liberty,  as reported in  Table 5.4.  Furthernore,  this  view that  financial
openness, civil liberties, and government social spending go hand in hand, is confirmed
by the help of econometric results shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6.25
Table 5.4:
Taxonomy of Financial Openness*
Country Grouping by Financial Openness
I  II  III  IV
(Open) (Largely Open)  (Largely Closed)  (Closed)
I  Civil Liberties'  2.37  3.7  3.6  5
2  GDP/cap 2 13147  2814  2374  1557
3  Social expenditure (%GDP) 3 22.3  20.7  12.9  6.7
4  Total government exp/GDP  0()4  26.0  19.9  23.4  27.7
5  General government consumption  16.1  17.9  15.5  14.7
(%  of GDP)3
Number of countries  46  1  1  33  11
* The table displays the group averages computed for the countries where the data were available
Definition of variables:
(1) Civil liberties, see footnote 13.
(2) GDP/cap, Gross Domestic Product per capita, average of 1990-97.
(3) Social expenditure, includes the sum of health, education, and social security and welfare; average 1991-97.
(4)Total government  expenditure,  average  of  central government  and budgetary  accounts plus  state  or  provincial
government, 1990-97.
(5) General government consumption, includes all current expenditures for purchases of goods and services by all levels of
government, excluding most government enterprises. It also includes capital expenditure on national defense and security,
1990-97.
24 Focusing on globalisation through trade, Rodrik (1997) also emphasizes the relationship between redistribution and
oPenness.
2More  rigorous econometric investigation (using logit analysis) will also show that countries that score high on both
political (civil) liberty and openness tend to spend a high proportion of their GDP on social needs, such as education,
health and transfer payments.  See Dailami (1999).
19Transfers and social spending ease the tension between  financial openness andpolitics
Figure  5.5:
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Note: The cross-country data, with sample size randing from 70 to  140, shows statistically significant
results for all three relationships, with the highest correlation between civil liberty and government social
expenditures (see Table A5.5 in the  Appendix for a summary of the  statistics and sources of the main
variables used).
20Figure 5.6:
Relationship between financial openness and social expenditure (controlling for per
capita income)
y =0.0772x  + 4E-16
R2 = 0.41
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()ne  important underlying motivation for redistribution is the  demand for  insurance,
induced by volatility and insecurity in underlying economic conditions and when citizens
are risk-averse.  26  Uncertainty  over citizens' future economic  position  and income level
can be an  important source of demand for insurance-like redistribution, distinct from
altruism  and other poverty reduction related motives.  27  And an important source of
volatility in economic conditions could be volatilit% in capital flows, as demonstrated
most radically  by the recent Asian finanlcial  crises.  8  The cross-country  evidence  also
establishes a robust positive relationship between capital volatility and volatility in rate of
economic growth (see figure 5.7)  Also, redistribution policy needs to be financed often
through  discretionary  taxation,  and  then  there  exists  the  associated  fiscal  and
macroeconomic cost, which needs to be taken into account.  How this trade-off between
the costs and benefits of redistribution is resolved remains an  importanlt question, to
which the experience of OECD countries could shed some light.
0.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
26The  idea  of distribution  as insurance  has,  of course,  a long  tradition  in welfare  economics  going  back  to Lerner
(1994); Harsanyi (1953),and Rawls (1971). More recently this issuechas  been analyzed from the perspective of
constitutional  political  economy,  see  Mueller  (I1997);  Wessels  (I1993).
27 See Wessels (1993) for a justification of this type of redistributive scheme, within the realm of methodological
individualism.
28 Indeed, the social costs associated with the recent crises in emerging market economies have been substantial.  Over
just one year,  unemployment  doubled  in Thailand  and tripled  in Korea,  while  standards  of living  declined  14  percent
and 22 percent,  respectively;  Indonesia  also  experienced  a 25 percent  decrease  in  standard  of living  (Stiglitz  and
Bhattacharya  1999).  Not quantifiable  are further  costs such  as lost schooling,  malnutrition  among  some,  and  political
strife.
2*1More volatile private capitalflows means more volatile growth
Figure 5.7:
Relationship between economic growth variability and volatility in private foreign
capital flows
y  2.0156x  + 2.1531
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Volatility  in capital flows
Today almost all modem  advanced democracies are also  open  to  international
capital  movements  and,  indeed  by  the  early  1990s  had  achieved  capital  account
convertibility on their currencies International policy coordination both in the domain of
macroeconomic policy conduct as well as in financial regulation and supervision is part
of the answer-but  not all.  It has been instrumental in reducing payment imbalances, in
stabilizing expectations regarding currency and interest rate movements, and in lessening
the volatility of capital flows across their borders. 29 In the same vein, the coordination of
international banking regulation among industrial countries has been quite significant,
exemplified by the landmark voluntary agreements such as the Basle Capital Accord of
1992, and the subsequent Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.
Capital Controls as Instrument of Risk Management
An  alternative  approach  for  resolving  the  tension  between  capital  market
integration and national policy autonomy is the use of capital controls.  Interest in this
approach has been rekindled by recent financial crises in Asia, and Latin America in both
academic and policy circles.  Thus, it is  increasingly being argued that  under some
circumstances, i.e., weakness in local financial markets, euphoria and panic behavior of
foreign investors, and structural balance of payments problems, there exists a case for
deploying capital controls, particularly on short-term flows, to reduce volatility.  In this
respect, a range of market-based capital flow interventions are available ranging from
contingent liquidity facilities (less severe) to  tax and reserve requirement on  selected
29 See Webb (1995) and Bryant and Hodgkinson  (1989) for a discussion of intemational policy coordination in
macroeconomics, and Kapstein (1989), for intemational coordination of banking regulation.
22inflows.  Chile's  capital controls experience (see box  5.2) has  attracted considerable
interest, partly because of its market-based nature, transparency, and the fact that, it is
easier to  phase out  restrictions based  on taxation than those on  quantitative controls.
Recent analysis indicates that the Chilean experience has been partially effective by
changing the debt composition-- reducing short-term capital inflows while increasing
long-term ones--, and  by allowing for  a larger wedge between domestic and  foreign
interest rates.  Much of these effects are likely to be temporary as controls are bound to
lose their effectiveness in today's highly mobile capital environment.
Box 5.2  Chile's capital  control measure through taxation. 30
Faced with rapid expansion of capital inflows during 1988-90, the Central Bank of Chile
imposed  in  1991, quantitative  restrictions  on  selective  inflows  in  the  form  of  an
unremunerated reserve  requirement (URR). At  the  same time  several  administrative
controls on outflows were lifted, including, ceilings on foreign asset holdings by financial
institutions -banks,  insurance companies, and pension fumds-relative  to their capital,
and the requirements that exporters surrender their export proceeds to the Central Bank of
Chile.
Chile's experiment has stimulated much interest.  A review of recent literature reveals the
following positive and negative aspects.
The  URR  seems  to  have  increased  the  scope  of  monetary  policy  conduct.  It  has
contributed to change the composition of inflow, towards longer term maturities.  On the
other hand, it led to a fall in short-term flows, which was only partly compensated by an
increase in long-tern capital inflows.
In addition, the introduction of the URR seems to have not affected the pattern of real
exchange  rate:  to  increase  short-term interest  rates,  thereby  adversely  affecting the
investment that it has directly contributed to.  And finally, it has involved transaction
costs in terms of the monitoring of  commercial banks.
For further analysis, see Sebastian Edwards (1998), Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls:
Some Latin American Experiences. Working paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. and Leonardo
Hernandez and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (1999), Capital Controls in Chile: Effective? Efficient? Endurable? A paper
presented at the World Bank conference on Capital Flows, Financial Crisis and Policies, April 15-16, 1999.
23VI.  Conclusion
The challenge facing the emerging economies in forging closer integration of their
capital markets can be seen in two areas. The iFirst  encompasses the pace at which these
countries  should dismantle administrative controls over  short-term capital  flows and
move toward full capital-account convertibility.  The second area includes the overall
incentive  system  and  regulations  that  could  govern  international financial  flows  to
minimize future risks and panics.  Countries, both internally and under the rules of an
international financial framework, need to develop suitable mechanisms for balancing the
benefits of globalization with the risks.  These mechanisms must work in  a way that
reduces the risks of panic and crisis, while remaining committed to free markets, free
capital flows, and the principle of individual choice.  Though technological advances and
the sheer size of financial markets make the risk of panic and crisis an ever-present one,
there are various options governments can follow to reduce significantly that risk.
Pursuing  sound macroeconomic policies  is  an  obvious  first  step,  an  essential
prerequisite. But recent experience also shows that macro stability alone is not sufficient
to  guarantee sustainable growth  unless reinforced by  actions to  strengthen domestic
regulation  and  supervision  of  banks  and  other  intermediaries;  rebuild  information
infrastructure of financial markets, including accounting norms; and improve corporate
governance.  With the increasing trend towards democracy world-wide, equally important
is the availability of mechanisms through which insurance is provided to citizens, either
through the marketplace or redistributive policy to  avert political pressure for  capital
controls.  In the long  run, the  globalization of capital requires an open  institutional
framework to ensure transparent accounts, secure property rights, enforceable contracts,
as well as regulations to control risk, yet such institutions do not exist or are only in the
early stages of development.
This  paper has presented information suggesting that  capital account openness,
political and civil liberties, and redistributive public policy need to be correlated. Keep in
mind the experience of OECD countries.  Capital mobility as a policy objective gained
currency and support only after significant trade liberalization, and only in democratic
countries in which the states had established the ability to respond to citizens' demands
for national economic security. By the time all OECD members had achieved full capital
openness and convertibility, there was a sophisticated system of state responsibility for
risk sharing in place. This must be taken into account when pondering the status and
future of developing countries along the road to  full capital account convertibility in
today's international financial environment.
24REFERENCES
Alesina, Alberto, Vittorino Grilli, and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, "The Political
Economy of Capital Controls, " in Capital Mobility:  The Impact on Consumption,
Investment, and Growth, ed. Leonardo Leiderman and Assaf Razin, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 289-328.
Bryant, Ralph C. and Edith Hodgkinson, "Problems of International Cooperation," in
Can Nations Agree?: Issues in International Economic Cooperation, (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1989), pp. 1-11.
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Enrique G. Mendoza, "Petty Crime and Cruel Punishment:
Lessons from the Mexican Debacle," in American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings, Vol. 86, No. 2, Fall 1998, pp. 1-3, 6.
Cooper, Richard, "Should Capital-Account Convertibility be a World Objective?, " in
Essays in International Finance Series,  207, (Princeton: International Finance Section,
Department of Economics, May 1998), pp. 11  -19.
Dailami, Mansoor, "Euphoria and Panic: Developing Countries' Relationship to Private
Finance," in EDI Forum, (Washington, D.C.: Economic Development Institute of the
World Bank), Vol. 3, No. 2, Fall 1998, pp. 1-3, 6.
,"Financial Openness, Democracy and Redistributive Policy,"
Unpublished World Bank Working Paper (1999).
, and  Nadeem  ul Haque,  "What  Macroeconomic  Policies  Are
'Sound?',"  World Bank and IMF Policy Research Working  Paper 1995, (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank).
Edwards, Sebastian, "Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls: Some
Latin American Experiences," working paper from the National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc., 1998.
Eichengreen, Barry, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary
System, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996).
Fischer, Stanley, "Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF," in Essays in
International Finance Series 207, (Princeton: International Finance Section, Department
of Economics, May 1998), pp. 1-10.
Garrett, Geoffrey, "Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous
Circle?," in International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998, pp. 787-824.
Gold, Joseph, International Capital Movements Under the Law of the International
Monetary Fund, (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1977).
25Harsanyi, J.C., "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-
Taking," in the Journal of Political Economy, 61: 434-35 (1953).
, "Cardinal  Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility," in the Journal of Political Economy, 63: 309-321 (1955).
Helleiner, Eric, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to
the 1990s, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994).
Hernandez, Leonardo and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, "Capital Controls in Chile: Effective?
Efficient? Endurable?" paper presented at the World Bank conference on Capital Flows,
Financial Crisis and Policies, April 15-16, 1999.
Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations and States.  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
Jorion, Philippe, "Risk 2: Measuring the Risk in Value at Risk," in Financial Analysts
Journal, November/December 1996, pp. 47-56.
Kapstein, Ethan B., "Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of
Banking Regulations," in International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1989,
pp.323-347.
Karatnycky, Adrian, "The 1998 Freedom House Survey: The Decline of Illiberal
Democracy," in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1999, pp. 112-125.
Lerner, A.P., Economics of Control, (New York: MacMillan, 1944).
Mueller, Dennis C., "Constitutional Constraints on Govermments  in a Global Economy,"
in Constitutional Political Economy, 1998: 9, pp. 171-186.
OECD, Liberalization of Capital Movements and Financial Services in the OECD Area,
OECD, 1990.
Polak, J., Essays in International Finance Series 207, (Princeton: International Finance
Section, Department of Economics, May 1998).
Quinn, Dennis, and A. Maria Toyoda, "Measuring International Financial Regulation,"
Georgetown University, Typescript, 1997.
, and Carla Inclan, "The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of
Current and Capital Account Liberalization," in American Journal of Political Science,
41(July, 1997):771-813.
Radelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis,
Remedies, Prospects," in  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, ed. William C.
Brainard and George L. Perry, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998), pp. 1-90.
26Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1971.
Razin, Assaf, and Andrew K. Rose, "Business-Cycle Volatility and Openness: An
Exploratory Cross-Sectional Analysis," in Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption,
Investment and Growth, ed. Leonardo Leidermann and Assaf Razin, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Rodrik, Dani, Has Globalization Gone Too Far?9,  Institute for International Economics.
Ruggie, John G., "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D.
Krasner, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 195-231.
Sachs, Jeffrey, Aaron Tomell and Andres Velasco, "Financial Crises in Emerging
Markets: The Lessons from 1995," in Discussion Paper Number 1759, (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University, 1996).
Sally, Razeen, "Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: An Advance
Sketch," in Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 1, March 1998, pp. 19-44.
Sandel, Michael J., Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy,
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1996).
Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Amar Bhattacharya, "Underpinnings for a Stable and Equitable
Global Financial System: From Old Debates to a New Paradigm," paper prepared for
Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, (Washington, DC: World Bank,
1999)
Verdier, D., "Domestic Responses to Capital Market Internationalization Under the Gold
Standard, 1870-1914," in  International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 1, Winter 1998.
Webb, Michael C.,  The Political Economy of Policy Coordination: International
Adjustment Since 1945, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994).
Wessels, J.H.,  "Redistribution from a Constitutional Perspective," Constitutional
Political Economy vol.4, no. 3: 425-448 (1993).
Williamson, John and Molly Mahar, "A Survey of Financial Liberalization," in Essays in
International Financial Series 211, (Princeton: International Finance Section,
Department of Economics, Novermber 1998).
World Bank, Global Development Finance, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1998).
27Annex
Note 1
The difference between the potential GDP (based on the growth rate of the real economy
over 1980-96) and the actual/estimated GDP in the three-year period 1997-99 is taken as
the economic cost due to the financial crisis.  The multi-year values were converted to
1996 values using a discount rate of 3 percent per year. Expressed as a percentage of the
stock of debt in 1996, the estimated costs of the crises were: 97 percent for Indonesia,
291 percent for Korea, 81 percent for Malaysia, and 128 percent for Thailand. Similar
computation for Brazil yields an estimate of 21 percent.  (Note: For Korea, the debt stock
figure used is for 1997.)
Table A5.5:
Macroeconomic  indicators  for affected  countries
Exchange  rates  Equity prices  Short rates  GDP growth  Consumer prices
Dec.97-  Jun.97 - Dec.97-  Jun.97 - Aug.98  Jun.97 - 1996  1997  1998  1996  1997  1998
Aug.98  Aug.98  Aug.98  Aug.98  Real Rate (  Aug.98
percent)
Indonesia  -47  -76  -16  -53  -8.9  4130  8.0  5.0  -5.0  7.9  6.6  44.3
Korea  20  -34  -18  -59  2.S  61  7.1  5.5  -0.8  4.9  4.5  10.5
Malaysia  -8  -40  -49  -72  3.1  214  8.6  7.8  2.5  3.S  2.7  7.5
Philippines  -11  -40  -36  -57  6.4  554  5.7  5.1  2.5  8.4  5.1  8.0
Thailand  11  -42  -41  -58  3.2  -380  5.5  -0.4  -3.1  5.9  5.6  11.6
Argentina  0  0  -47  -55  8.4  155  4.2  8.4  5.5  0.2  0.8  0.3
Brazil  -5  -8  -34  -46  17.0  -122  2.8  3.0  1.5  15.5  6.0  3.3
Mexico  -19  -21  -40  -29  17.9  505  5.2  7.0  4.8  34.4  20.6  13.4
Russia  -50  -52  -79  -79  115.5  7906  -2.8  0.4  1.0  48.0  15.0  8.0
South Africa  -25  -30  -20  -33  16.3  484  3.2  1.7  2.2  7.4  8.6  6.0
(percentage changes over the period indicated, except for interest rates)
Source: World Bank and IMF.
28Table A5.6:
Date that selected IMF member countries have assumed Article VIII
El Salvador  11/06/46  Iceland  09/19/83
Mexico  11/12/46  Spain  07/15/86
Panama  11/26/46  Indonesia  05/07/88
United  States  12/10/46  Portugal  09/12/88
Republic  of Korea  11/01/88
Honduras  07/01/50
Canada  03125152  Turkey  03/22/90
Dominican  Republic  08/01/53  Thailand  05/04/90
Switzerland  05/29/92
Belgium  02/15/61  Greece  07/22/92
France  02/15/61  Tunisia  01/06/93
Germany  02/15/61  Morocco  01/21/93
Ireland  02115/61  Israel  09/21/93
Luxembourg  02/15/61  Mauritius  09/29/93
Netherlands  02/15/61  Barbados  11/03/93
Sweden  02/15/61  Trinidad  and Tobago  12/13/93
Italy  02/15/61  Ghana  02/02/94
United  Kingdom  02/15/61  Sri Lanka  03/15/94
Austria  08/01/62  Bangladesh  04/11/94
Jamaica  02/22/63  Lithuania  05/03/94
Kuwait  04/05/63  Latvia  06/10/94
Japan  04/01/64  Pakistan  07/01/94
Nicaragua  07/30/64  Estonia  08/15/94
Costa  Rica  02/01/65  India  08/20/94
Australia  07/01165  Paraguay  08123/94
Guyana  12/27/66  Malta  11/30/94
Denmark  05/01/67  Croatia  05/29/95
Norway  05/11/67  Poland  06/01/95
Bolivia  06/05/67  Moldova  06/30/95
Argentina  05/14/68  Slovenia  09/01/95
Singapore  11/09/68  Philippines  09/08/95
Malaysia  11/11/68  Czech  Republic  10/01/95
Slovak  Republic  10/01/95
Ecuador  08/31/70  Botswana  11/17/95
Bahrain  03/20/73  Malawi  12/07/95
South  Africa  09/15/73  Hungary  01/01/96
The Bahamas  12/05/73  Mongolia  02/01/96
Papua  New  Guinea  12/04/75  Benin  06/01/96
Venezuela  07/01/76  Burkina  Faso  06/01/96
Chile  07/27/77  Cameroon  06/01/96
Mali  06/01/96
Uruguay  05/02/80  Russian  Federation  06/01/96
New  Zealand  08/05/82  Namibia  09/20/96
Belize  06/14/83  Romania  03/25/98
Source: Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange  Restrictions,  Annual  Report  1998
29Table A5.7:
Volatility Indicators (standard deviation of growth rates) averaged across developing countries
Volatility Indicators  70's  80's  90's
Inflation (CPI % change)  16.3613  209.9162  125.2165
Export Growth Rate  0.2143  0.1637  0.1296
GDP growth  0.0443  0.0418  0.0261
Volatility Change
Volatility Indicators  80's  90's
Inflation (CPI % change)  193.5549  -84.6997
Export Growth Rate  -0.0507  -0.0341
GDP growth  -0.0024  -0.0157
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